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DEFECTIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
 
Jill Wieber Lens* 
 
Abstract 
Private redress theories of punitive damages recognize an 
individual victim’s right to be punitive. That right exists because the 
defendant knew its conduct would probably cause the victim a severe 
injury, yet the defendant still acted, willfully injuring the victim. The 
injured victim can seek and obtain punitive damages to punish the 
defendant for disrespecting her rights.  
This Article is the first to apply private redress theories of punitive 
damages to claims involving a defective product. This application is 
unexpectedly difficult because of the importance of evidence of harm to 
nonparties in establishing defect, and because the defendant’s 
knowledge of the probable injury was not specific to the injured victim 
but instead general to all potential victims.  
Absent special circumstances, the manufacturer disrespected each 
of the injured victims in the same way. Consistent with private redress 
theories, each injured plaintiff can seek punishment for that disrespect. 
But the disrespect is not unique and each injured plaintiff should receive 
an identical punitive damage award. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
If a manufacturer sells a defective product, that product will likely injure 
many victims. If those victims successfully sue, they can recover compensatory 
damages for their injuries. If the manufacturer also acted willfully or recklessly in 
injuring the victims, the victims may also recover punitive damages. Each victim 
will bring her own claim against the manufacturer, however, meaning that each 
victim could recover a different amount of punitive damages. This lack of 
consistency is not problematic. As the Supreme Court long ago explained in TXO 
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,1 “a jury imposing a punitive 
damages award must make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and 
circumstances unique to the particular case before it. Because no two cases are 
truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to make.”2  
                                                      
* © 2017 Jill Wieber Lens. Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law. J.D., 
University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin. The author thanks 
Mike Green, Ben Zipursky, Chris Robinette, and Luke Meier for their comments on earlier 
drafts. Any mistakes are, of course, the author’s.    
1 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
2 Id. at 457. 
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TXO was the last time the Supreme Court found a punitive damage award 
constitutional.3 Much has changed. The Court recognized numerous constitutional 
limitations,4 which have affected scholarly debate regarding theoretical 
conceptions of punitive damages. The conception that best reflects those 
constitutional limitations is a private redress theory. Under private redress theories, 
punitive damages provide plaintiffs redress for the willful or reckless disrespect 
caused by defendants. This personalization of the punitive damage award, specific 
to the disrespect to the individual victim, should similarly create inconsistent 
awards as each case will have its own facts and circumstances, just as the Court 
described in TXO.  
However, victims injured by the same defective product will rely on the same 
facts. Plaintiffs seeking to establish either a design or warning defect will introduce 
evidence of the fact that the product injured many victims.5 Those same plaintiffs, 
if they seek punitive damages, will also introduce evidence of another shared 
fact—that the manufacturer knew of the probable injury its product would cause, 
yet still sold it.6 Product defect claims are somewhat unique because the success of 
an individual plaintiff depends on her showing the defendant similarly and 
knowingly injured others.  
Private redress theories do not explicitly contemplate the possibility of 
identical awards but victims injured by the same defective product are disrespected 
in the same way. Crudely put, victims injured by a defective product are 
interchangeable. Their compensable injuries will differ, but the manufacturer 
disrespected them identically. Punitive damage awards based on that identical 
disrespect should also be identical. The collection of identical punitive damage 
awards then appropriately punishes the manufacturer for what it did—knowingly 
endangering many people by selling a defective product.  
Part II explains private redress theories of punitive damages and how the 
Court’s various constitutional limitations on punitive damages support those 
theories. Part III examines the importance of nonparty harm in product defect 
claims, including its role in demonstrating defect and the fact that the 
manufacturer’s reprehensible conduct was generally directed at all those injured by 
the defective product. Part IV applies private redress theories to product defect 
claims. It describes how the manufacturer disrespects each injured victim 
identically with the defective product, and suggests reforms to achieve a system 
where victims receive identical punitive damage awards. Part V briefly concludes. 
  
                                                      
3 Id. at 462. 
4 See infra Part II.B. 
5 See infra Part III.A. 
6 See infra Part III.B. 
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II.  THE CURRENT PROMINENCE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES  
UNDER PRIVATE REDRESS THEORIES 
 
Generally, a state can impose punitive damages to punish and deter 
tortfeasors. Punitive damages are available to a plaintiff if she can establish that the 
defendant’s conduct was “outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of others.”7 A defendant acts with reckless 
indifference when she consciously disregards the fact that her conduct creates a 
highly probable risk of death or substantial physical harm to another.8 The jury 
decides whether the defendant acted with evil intent or recklessly. The jury also 
decides how much to award in punitive damages.9  
The standards for imposing punitive damages are well established. The 
concept behind what punitive damages can and should do—either punish certain 
conduct or deter certain actors—has been subject to much debate. The current 
prominent conception of punitive damages is as a mechanism for private redress. 
This conception is the most consistent with the various constitutional limitations 
the Court has placed on punitive damages. 
 
A.  Private Redress Theories of Punitive Damages 
 
Professors Thomas Colby, Benjamin C. Zipursky, and Anthony Sebok each 
present theories of punitive damages based on private redress. Although their 
reasoning differs, all three conclude that punitive damages must be limited to 
redressing the plaintiff for the defendant’s disrespect. 
  
                                                      
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also DAN 
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 3.11(2) at 319 (2d ed. 
1993) (stating that courts allow the recovery of punitive damages “if [the defendant] is 
malicious . . . reckless . . . oppressive, evil, wicked, guilty of wanton or morally culpable 
conduct, or shows flagrant indifference to the safety of others”).  
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
9 Id. at § 908 cmt.d. 
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1.  Professor Thomas Colby 
 
Professor Colby criticizes “total harm” punitive damages that punish the 
defendant for the harm it caused to the plaintiff and others.10 First, he explores the 
history of punitive damages.11 After reviewing the English tradition of punitive 
damages and American courts’ incorporation of it, Colby concludes that “punitive 
damages, even when regarded as punishment, were consciously limited to the 
amount necessary to punish the defendant for the wrong done, and the harm 
caused, to the individual plaintiff only.”12 
Colby then explains the importance of this history—“[p]unitive damages owe 
their constitutionality solely to their history.”13 If punitive damages no longer 
reflect their historical conception “as punishment for private wrongs,” it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to explain their constitutionality.14 Moreover, if 
punitive damages punished more than the private wrong—the wrong to the 
public—punitive damages would be “all but indistinguishable from criminal 
punishment, but [without] afford[ing] any criminal procedural safeguards.”15 
Punitive damages punishing more than the private wrong to the specific plaintiff 
are thus unconstitutional.16    
                                                      
10 See generally Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: 
Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 584, 
658–62 (2003) (recommending that society should eliminate “total harm” punitive 
damages). 
11 Id. at 614–30. 
12 Id. at 628. 
13 Id. at 643. 
14 Id. at 591. 
15 Id.  
16 Professors Zipursky and Sebok criticized some of Professor Colby’s reasoning. 
Specifically, Professor Zipursky criticizes the idea that procedural safeguards would still 
not be required even if punishment is for private wrong, Colby’s definitions of public 
versus private wrongs, and his reliance on the punishment and deterrence purposes of 
punitive damages because it undercuts his point. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of 
Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 142–44 (2005). Professor Sebok questions 
whether Professor Colby’s historical account is accurate, why procedural safeguards would 
not still be required for punishment of private wrongs, and for “transfer[ring] the structural 
relationship between wrong and sanction found in public law to private law.” See Anthony 
J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1003–07 (2007). 
In his later work, Professor Colby answered those criticisms. See Thomas B. Colby, 
Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of 
Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L. J. 392, 450–57 (2008) [hereinafter Colby, Clearing the 
Smoke]. He addresses why punishment for private wrongs would not require criminal 
procedural protections: that the Court has drawn such a distinction and “[a]s punishment 
for private wrongs, punitive damages really do serve a very different goal from the one that 
triggers criminal procedural safeguards.” Id. at 454. 
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Professor Colby later explains that Philip Morris USA v. Williams17 signaled 
the end of “total harm” damages.18 He disagrees with the procedural due process 
based reasoning,19 but agrees with the conclusion that punitive damages can, 
constitutionally, only punish private wrongs: “The Constitution thus mandates that, 
absent criminal procedural safeguards, punitive damages may be employed as 
punishment for private wrongs, but not as punishment for public wrongs.”20 
 
2.  Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky 
 
Professor Zipursky presents an interpretive theory of punitive damages, 
explaining that punitive damages have a “double aspect problem.”21 He later labels 
those two aspects as “the private redress conception” and “the noncompliance 
sanction conception.”22  
The private redress conception is based in civil recourse theory, which he and 
Professor John Goldberg introduce.23 Civil recourse theory states that tort law is 
“about respecting the rights between the private parties” and enabling “individuals 
who have been wronged to seek redress through the courts for having been 
wronged.”24 When the defendant acts willfully, the “response entitlement” includes 
the ability to seek more than damages to compensate for the injury.25 The plaintiff 
is entitled to be punitive and inflict an injury on the defendant in the form of 
punitive damages.26  
                                                      
17 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
18 Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 16, at 400. 
19 Id. at 413 (“The majority’s reasoning makes sense only if . . . punitive damages are 
not a form of punishment for public wrongs to society.”). See also id. at 412 (criticizing the 
Court’s procedural due process bases because “the judicial system does not care whether 
the defendant would be liable to each and every one of its alleged victims in tort” when 
punishing public harm).  
20 Id. at 455.  
21 Zipursky, supra note 16, at 129–30 (explaining that punitive damages “are in part 
like fines collected by the bounty hunters who prosecute tort cases, and they are in part like 
damages awarded in a civil action.”).  
22 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1757, 1777 (2012) [hereinafter Zipursky, Palsgraf]. 
23 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 917, 972 (2010). 
24 Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22, at 1777–78.  
25 Id. at 1779. See also Zipursky, supra note 16, at 151 (explaining that the “plaintiff 
is entitled to go beyond making whole; she is entitled to be punitive. This permission exists 
because of the manner in which she was wronged—willfully and maliciously.”). Professor 
Sebok argues that there is a “piece missing from Zipursky’s argument” because the private 
redress model “seems to be nothing less than the power to deliver the wrongdoer to the 
court for punishment based ‘on the defendant’s conduct and character.’” Sebok, supra note 
16, at 1026–27.  
26 Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22, at 1781. 
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The noncompliance sanction conception is a public-law model. The plaintiff 
is essentially a “private attorney general . . . bringing the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct to the attention of a jury, which is then supposed to select a financial 
penalty that will send a strong deterrent message to the defendant about the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.”27 This idea of using punitive damages to deter 
corporate misconduct is “largely a development of the twentieth century.”28 
Professor Zipursky introduces these two aspects to help explain the 
constitutionality of a punitive damage award: that “status . . . turns on whether the 
imposition of punitive damages should be understood as a matter of private redress 
or as a noncompliance sanction.”29 If the state is empowering the plaintiff to be 
punitive as a part of her seeking her own private redress consistent with the private 
redress conception, the punitive damage award is constitutional if imposed under 
normal tort law procedural protections.30 But if the state is empowering the 
plaintiff to act like an attorney general and effectively enforce state sanctions 
consistent with the noncompliance section conception, then criminal procedural 
protections are constitutionally required.31  
To tell the difference, Professor Zipursky advocates using what he calls the 
nonparty-harm rule from Philip Morris: “Where the jury is asked to punish the 
defendant for harm to a person who is the plaintiff or is represented by the 
plaintiff, it is prima facie permissible for the court to allow punitive damages, 
because they empower the plaintiff to redress the injury to herself . . . .”32  But, if 
“the jury is asked to punish the defendant for harm to a person who is neither the 
plaintiff nor someone represented by the plaintiff . . . [the court] must infer that the 
award is intended in part as a noncompliance sanction” and is unconstitutional 
because of the lack of procedural protections.33 
 
3.  Professor Anthony Sebok 
 
Professor Sebok seeks to provide an interpretive and adequate theory of 
punitive damages. He first looks to history, explaining that early English punitive 
damage cases “focus[ed] on the insulting and humiliating character of the 
tortfeasor’s act.”34 Later American cases similarly imposed punitive damages in 
cases where the defendant consciously disdained the plaintiff’s rights, thereby 
expressing disrespect “similar to that expressed by an act of insult or 
humiliation.”35   
                                                      
27 Id. at 1780–81. 
28 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Punitive Damages After Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 44 
CT. REV. 134 (2007) [hereinafter Zipursky, Punitive Damages].  
29 Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22, at 1785. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1787. 
33 Id.  
34 Sebok, supra note 16, at 1009. 
35 Id. at 1013. 
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After discussing this history, Professor Sebok turns to philosopher Jean 
Hampton’s work on moral injuries: “A person behaves wrongfully in a way that 
effects a moral injury to another when she treats that person in a way that is 
precluded by that person’s value, and/or by representing him as worth far less than 
his actual value.”36 Sebok then explains that “[p]unishment is the appropriate 
response to impermissible exercises of power because it is a form of defeating the 
wrongdoer.”37 That punishment must be within a claim brought by the victim 
because “[n]o one else can establish the victim’s true value” and “nothing can 
establish the truth except the wrongdoer’s own defeat by the victim.”38 Sebok 
recharacterizes Hampton’s retributive idea as one of personal revenge.  
Professor Sebok then applies this revenge concept to civil recourse theory, 
explaining that the right to redress is personal to the injured plaintiff.39 The 
plaintiff has a right to her tort claim and to punitive damages when the defendant 
violates two rights: “[t]he primary private right (to physical security, property, etc.) 
and the right to be treated as someone deserving to have those primary private 
rights respected by others (or at least the defendant).”40 The plaintiff has control 
and the “right to decide whether and how the wrongdoer will suffer punishment.”41 
She “argu[es] for punishment based on reasons that she hopes the court will take as 
objectively valid” and, if accepted, “[t]he victory of her argument for punishment 
(and not the state’s) . . . is her redress.”42  
Although Professors Colby, Zipursky, and Sebok “take very different routes 
to get there,” they “arrive at nearly the same place.”43 They all argue that punitive 
                                                      
36 Id. at 1018 (quoting Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: 
The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1661 (1992)). 
37 Id. at 1019. 
38 Id. at 1020. 
39 Id. at 1023–24. 
40 Id. at 1014. 
41 Id. at 1029. 
42 Id. 
43 Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 16, at 422, n. 125. Professor Colby admits 
that his argument “builds upon the important work of Anthony Sebok and Benjamin 
Zipursky” and that when he states that “punitive damages are punishment for private 
wrongs,” he means that “punitive damages are a form of legally sanctioned private 
revenge, designed to vindicate a plaintiff’s legal right to be punitive in a court of law.” Id. 
Similarly Professor Zipursky admits that his view that the plaintiff is “allowed to be 
punitive” has a “quality of vengefulness.” Zipursky, supra note 16, at 154. Professor Sebok 
focuses on the vengeful quality of punitive damages, calling them a form of state-
sanctioned revenge. Professor Zipursky mentions this function but, consistent with civil 
recourse theory, seeks to explain what punitive damages are separate from their possible 
functions. Id. Still, both Professors Sebok and Zipursky cite to Zipursky’s Palsgraf article 
to explain the personal nature of punitive damages. Id. at 150; Sebok, supra note 16, at 
1024. Also, both look to the original English tort law role of punitive damages addressing 
the defendant’s insult of the plaintiff. Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22 at 1779 (explaining 
that his private redress conception of punitive damages “comes close to capturing the 
original role of punitive damages in English tort law”); Sebok, supra note 16, at 1008–13 
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damage awards are based on the defendant’s disrespect to the plaintiff,44 and that 
the punitive damage award serves as redress for the private wrong the plaintiff 
suffered.45 
 
B.  How Constitutional Limitations Reflect Private Redress Theories 
 
The Supreme Court has not weighed in on the “correct” theoretical 
conception of punitive damages.46 But the Court has been active in defining 
constitutional limitations on punitive damages. These limitations affect the 
theoretical conception of punitive damages because they restrict what the state can 
seek to accomplish when imposing punitive damages.  
Before the Court began defining constitutional limitations for the damage, it 
“repeatedly referred to punitive damages as punishment for ‘reprehensible 
conduct,’ which would seem to include all consequences thereof.”47 In BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore,48 a products liability case based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation, however, the Court introduced three guideposts to test whether 
                                                      
(describing the English conception of punitive damages).  
44 Both Professors Zipursky and Sebok offer interpretative theories of punitive 
damages, not normative ones. Thus, they do not necessarily make arguments regarding 
how punitive damages should be conceived, but instead how punitive damages are 
conceived. Zipursky, supra note 16, at 163; Sebok, supra note 16, at 1026. 
45 One place they arrive at is discounting deterrence’s involvement with punitive 
damages. Zipursky believes that deterrence is relevant only to the noncompliance sanction 
function, for which criminal protections are necessary. See Zipursky, supra note 16, at 155, 
170. Similarly, Sebok argues that under his model, punitive damage awards are not a “form 
of public law (serving the state’s interest in deterrence or retribution).” Sebok, supra note 
16, at 977–89, 1032. Numerous scholars also believe that the Supreme Court has 
abandoned the deterrence purpose of punitive damage. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, 
Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The Significance of Philip 
Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 365 (2008) (arguing that the Court 
“discounted the deterrent function of punitive damages” in Philip Morris); Colby, Clearing 
the Smoke, supra note 16, at 459–60 (arguing that deterrence is no different from 
punishment); F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages 
Awards: “Morals Without Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 383 (2008) (“[T]he Court has 
allowed its preference for retribution to trump considerations of . . . deterrence.”). 
46 It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever do so. The theoretical conception of 
punitive damages—what they should punish—is a question of state law, meaning only the 
highest state court can resolve the conceptual question. 
47 Colby, supra note 10, at 603 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 
(1974)). Consistent with this and before Philip Morris, many scholars introduced theories 
enabling punitive damages to achieve broader, public goals. See, e.g., Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 877 n.13 (1998); Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring). 
48 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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a punitive damage award is “grossly excessive” and thus unconstitutional.49 The 
first, and “most important” guidepost, is whether the damages are commensurate to 
the level of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.50 The second guidepost 
looks at the punitive damage award’s “ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff,” and whether the punitive damages “bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to 
[the] compensatory damages” awarded.51 The last guidepost is a comparison of the 
punitive damage award to the civil or criminal penalties imposed for comparable 
conduct.52  
No clear theoretical conception emerges from the guideposts. But the 
reasonable relationship guidepost suggests a need to focus on the private wrong to 
the individual plaintiff. “[I]t would make no sense to require a reasonable 
relationship between the amount of punitive damages and the amount of the 
individual plaintiff’s compensatory damages” if “punitive damages were 
punishment for the full scope of the wrong to society . . . .”53 
The Court in BMW also followed a private redress conception when it 
discussed how punitive damages cannot punish a defendant for conduct committed 
in another state.54 In the next punitive damages case after BMW, State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell,55 the Court stated that punitive damages 
cannot punish a defendant for “dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon 
which liability was premised.”56 These limitations on the scope of punishment—
although not yet specific to the defendant’s injury to the plaintiff—suggest that 
punitive damages cannot punish the defendant for every consequence of its 
conduct.  
The Court’s next constitutional limitation on punitive damages in Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams further limited the scope of possible punishment.57 The 
plaintiff, the widow of a man who died from lung cancer, sued a cigarette 
manufacturer for negligence and fraud.58 The fraud claims were based on the 
defendant’s false representations “that there was a legitimate controversy about 
                                                      
49 Id. at 574–75. 
50 Id. at 575. 
51 Id. at 580 (citation omitted). 
52 Id. at 583. See generally Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional 
Constraints on Punitive Damages: Clarity, Consistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 
HASTINGS L. J. 1257 (2015) (providing a thorough review of how lower courts apply the 
guideposts). 
53 Colby, supra note 10, at 607. But see infra note 163 (discussing Sebok’s opinion of 
the reasonable relationship guidepost).  
54 BMW, 517 U.S. at 572 (“We think it follows from these principles of state 
sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its 
laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”).  
55 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
56 Id. at 422–23.  
57 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2007). 
58 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub 
nom. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003). 
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whether there was a connection between cigarette smoking and human health.”59 
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant made these representations “intend[ing] to 
encourage smokers to continue to smoke and not to make the necessary effort to 
stop smoking.”60 The jury found the defendant liable for negligence and fraud.61   
In closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney mentioned that the defendant 
had made these misrepresentations to many more people than the individual 
plaintiff: “It’s fair to think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 
years in the State of Oregon there have been. It’s more than fair to think about how 
many more are out there in the future.”62 The plaintiff’s attorney further 
encouraged the jury to think of “how many people do we see outside . . . smoking 
cigarettes? For every hundred, cigarettes that they smoke are going to kill ten 
through lung cancer.”63 
The jury awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages.64 Philip Morris’s main 
argument on appeal was that the $79.5 million punitive damage award was 
unconstitutional because it “represented punishment for its having harmed others” 
and not just the plaintiff to the lawsuit.65  The Supreme Court agreed: “We did not 
previously hold explicitly that a jury may not punish for the harm caused others. 
But we do so hold now.”66  
The Court found that punishment for nonparty harm violates procedural due 
process in two ways.67 First, it deprives the defendant the opportunity to defend 
                                                      
59 Id. at 832.  
60 Id. at 832–33. 
61 Id. at 828. 
62 Joint App., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 
2006 WL 2147483, at *197a. 
63 Id. at *199a. 
64 Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 350. The trial court found the award excessive and 
reduced it to $32 million. Id. But the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million 
punitive award. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d at 842.  
65 Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 351. 
66 Id. at 356–57. 
67 Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353–54. Many have questioned the procedural due 
process basis for the holding. See Vikram David Amar, Business and Constitutional 
Originalism in the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 979, 982–83 (2009) 
(suggesting that labeling Philip Morris as procedural swayed Justices Roberts and Alito to 
join the opinion and “to sleep a little easier”); Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 16, at 
401–05 (explaining that the Court intentionally disguises substantive due process decisions 
as procedural due process decisions because it is “ashamed of the substantive due process 
doctrine’s very existence”); David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? 
Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1019, 1038–39 (2009) (“Perhaps in order to keep the Chief Justice and Justice Alito 
from defecting, Justice Breyer took [great] pains in Philip Morris to ground his opinion in 
the procedural rather than the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Jill 
Wieber Lens, Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2012) (“Phillip Morris mandated that lower courts adopt some 
procedural protections to prevent punitive damages from encompassing the defendant’s 
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itself against the claims of injured nonparties.68 For instance, the defendant would 
not be liable if the nonparties knew that smoking was dangerous and thus could not 
establish reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations.69 Without reliance, 
liability and punishment would not be appropriate. Second, punishment for harm to 
nonparties would “add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages 
equation” based on the number of harmed nonparties, the extent of their injuries, 
and the circumstances of those injuries.70 These questions, which will likely not be 
answered in the trial, heighten the “risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of 
notice” within the imposition of punitive damages.71 
At the same time, the Court clarified that the jury may still consider nonparty 
harm in determining reprehensibility because “harm to others shows more 
reprehensible conduct.”72 Presumably, this allows the jury to increase the award 
based on nonparty harm when it demonstrates reprehensibility, although the jury 
cannot increase the award to directly punish for that same nonparty harm. The 
Court mandated that lower courts provide “some form of protection” to ensure that 
the jury considers the evidence of harm to nonparties in evaluating 
reprehensibility, but not as a basis for punishment.73  
In Philip Morris, the Court did not embrace the language of private redress 
theory that empowers victims and gives them the right to be punitive when 
prohibiting punishment of nonparty harm. However, focusing on the defendant’s 
act of injuring the plaintiff does resemble a private redress theory. Noted torts 
scholars recognized so. The late Professor Richard Nagareda explained that “[t]he 
constitutional message in Williams—that punitive damages are ultimately about 
punishment for the wrong done to the plaintiff at hand—gives a considerable nod 
to what [is] described as plaintiff-focused views in torts literature.”74 Professor 
Michael Rustad once argued that punitive damages “serve[] the useful purpose of 
expressing society’s disapproval of conduct which leads to intolerable rates of 




                                                      
harm to nonparties, another substantive limitation on punitive damages arguably created in 
State Farm.”); see also Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process 
regime this Court has created for punitive damages.”). 
68 Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353–54. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 354. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 355. 
73 Id. at 357.  
74 Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1105, 1136 (2010). 
75 Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing 
Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 86 (1992). 
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assumed that Philip Morris reached out and harmed Jesse Williams, an individual 
smoker. While the Court still celebrates the historic functions of punishment and 
deterrence, its reasoning in Williams is very similar to what the civil recourse 
theorists propose.”76 
 
III.  UNDERESTIMATING THE IMPORTANCE OF NONPARTY HARM IN PRODUCT 
DEFECT CLAIMS 
 
Private redress theories now dominate the debate regarding the theoretical 
conception of punitive damages. The theories empower the individual victim 
seeking redress. The emphasis on the individual in the punishment portion of the 
tort claim matches the claim for liability, which “focus[es] on the wrong done, and 
the harm caused, to the plaintiff.”77   
This emphasis on the individual, however, does not fit all tort claims.78 
Specifically, this emphasis does not fit product defect claims due to the importance 
and role of injured nonparties in such claims. First, an individual plaintiff likely 
needs to show nonparty harm to demonstrate that the product that injured her is 
defective. Second, evidence of the defendant’s reprehensibility involves 
nonparties; if the defendant knew of probable injury, it was not just of potential 
injury to the plaintiff—it was to all exposed. 
 
A.  Crucial Part of Demonstrating Defect 
 
A products liability claim is usually brought by one plaintiff. One plaintiff is 
injured by an allegedly defective product and seeks compensation for that injury. 
Some evidence the plaintiff needs to show to demonstrate liability is specific to 
that plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff needs to show that she was actually injured 
because actual damage is a required element.79 Part of showing actual injury is 
showing actual damage.80 If the plaintiff is physically injured, she will present 
                                                      
76 Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 512 (2011) 
(citations omitted). 
77 Colby, supra note 10, at 654. See also Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to 
Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
892, 901 (1983) (explaining that courts hear only “individual cases, and their inquiries are 
confined to the particular facts and arguments in the cases before them.”). 
78 This Article does not address punitive damages in products liability claims because 
such awards are skyrocketing or out of control—as many claimed in the 1980s. Rustad, 
supra note 75, at 2–16. To the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that punitive damages 
are “rarely awarded” in products liability claims. Id. at 45. Instead, this Article addresses 
punitive damages in products defect claims because of the interesting application of private 
redress theories to those awards.  
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
(requiring “harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”); Id. § 9 (requiring “harm to 
persons or property caused by the misrepresentation.”). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2010). 
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evidence of that physical injury, any related lost wages, and any related pain and 
suffering, etc. Another required element is specific causation.81 The plaintiff needs 
to show that the defective product specifically caused her injury. Evidence of 
nonparty harm is unlikely to demonstrate specific causation.82 
Many other elements of the individual plaintiff’s product defect claim involve 
evidence not specific to the individual plaintiff. For example, to demonstrate 
general causation—that the product is capable of causing injury—the plaintiff will 
likely seek to introduce evidence of nonparty harm.83 In toxic tort cases, the 
plaintiff will “often rely on epidemiological studies and animal studies” as indirect 
evidence “that a particular substance causes a particular injury.”84 This evidence is 
helpful because the more people who are injured in a certain way by a defective 
product, the more it demonstrates that defective product was capable of causing the 
injury to the plaintiff. A plaintiff will also often look to nonparty harm to establish 
proximate causation—that the injury the plaintiff suffered was a foreseeable result 
of the defect.85 Again, the more people who are injured in a certain way by a 
defective product, the more probable it is that the injury was foreseeable to the 
defendant. For purposes of establishing causation, it is advantageous for the 
plaintiff to present herself as one of many injured by introducing evidence of 
nonparty harm. 
The plaintiff will also likely seek to introduce evidence of nonparty harm to 
demonstrate that the product is defective. In the context of determining 
defectiveness, evidence of nonparty harm is usually referred to as evidence of 
other accidents.86 This evidence of nonparty harm or other accidents is not just 
advantageous for demonstrating defect, it is practically required. Under the risk 
utility test, a product is defectively designed if “the nature and extent of a 
product’s dangerous condition”87 outweigh the costs of a reasonable alternative 
design. How better to show the product’s dangerous condition than to show that 
the product has injured others? “Evidence that there have been 100 accidents 
involving the same model SUV under similar circumstances” helps demonstrate a 
                                                      
81 In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
82 Population-based epidemiological studies are usually not enough to prove specific 
causation. Harvey Brown & Melissa Davis, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses: Fifteen 
Years Later, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 112–13 (2014). But see In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 892–93 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (allowing the 
use of epidemiological studies to demonstrate specific causation when the studies show “a 
relative risk greater than 2.0.”). 
83 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 404 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining that 
evidence of nonparty harm is relevant to “the causal relationship between the condition and 
the plaintiff’s harm.”); Zipursky, Punitive Damages, supra note 28, at 146–47 (discussing 
that evidence of prior injuries can be “introduced to show general causation.”). 
84 Brown & Davis, supra note 82, at 113. 
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 435 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (explaining that 
liability will not result if it was “highly extraordinary” that the defendant’s conduct caused 
the plaintiff’s injury). 
86 See infra note 98 (listing cases). 
87 OWEN, supra note 83, at 404.  
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high probability of accident and severity of accident.88 The more who are injured, 
and the more severe the injuries are, the greater the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
be able to establish that the nature and extent of the danger posed by the product 
outweighs the costs of an alternative design. To outweigh the costs of the 
alternative design, the plaintiff needs to show that nonparties—those “who are in 
no way related to the litigation”89—were also injured by the defective product. 
Evidence of nonparty harm may be the only evidence available to show 
defect. Products liability expert Professor David Owen listed the following ways to 
establish defectiveness: 1) use of the product malfunction test if facts are 
unavailable to show defectiveness; 2) violation of a government safety standard; 3) 
evidence of “similar accidents involving the defendant’s other similar products[;]” 
or 4) evidence “that the defendant acknowledged the problem by remedying the 
hazard after the plaintiff’s injury.”90 The three options other than evidence of 
nonparty harm may be unavailable because some facts are unknown. This deprives 
the plaintiff of: 1) the malfunction test; 2) the safety standard;91 and 3) defendant 
changes. This leaves the plaintiff with the option of relying on evidence of other 
accidents, also known as nonparty harm. 
But even in the unlikely case that other evidence is available, evidence of 
nonparty harm is widely considered advantageous for plaintiffs. “Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys consider other-accident evidence to be an especially powerful form of 
proof . . . .”92 Commentators have explained that evidence of nonparty harm “is 
arguably the single most important category of evidence available to the 
plaintiff,”93 is “the strongest evidence the plaintiff can adduce,”94 is often “vital” to 
the plaintiff’s case,95 and “can be critical to the outcome of a case.”96 And the use 
                                                      
88 Id. 
89 Zipursky, Punitive Damages, supra note 28, at 145.  
90 See David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L. J. 1, 3–4 (2004).  
91 Additionally, if a government agency created an applicable safety standard, it likely 
only did so after determining that the product injured many—necessitating the safety 
standard. Therefore, even a violation of a safety standard depends on nonparty harm. If the 
defendant violated a safety standard, however, the plaintiff would not need to present 
evidence of nonparty harm to demonstrate the product’s defectiveness. 
92 OWEN, supra note 83, at 403. 
93 Francis H. Hare, Jr., Admissibility of Evidence Concerning Other Similar Incidents 
in a Defective Design Product Case: Courts Should Determine “Similarity” by Reference 
to the Defect Involved, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 491, 494 (1998). 
94 Id. at 504. 
95 Id. at 522. See also Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 
1434, 1440 (10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that “the occurrence of similar accidents or 
failures involving the same product has great impact on a jury.”). 
96 Robert A. Sachs, “Other Accident” Evidence in Product Liability Actions: Highly 
Probative or an Accident Waiting to Happen?, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 293 (1996); id. at 
258 (explaining that evidence of other accidents “has the potential to affect significantly 
the outcome of the case.”). See also Gail A. Randall, Product Liability Litigation: Impact 
of the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) Upon Admissibility Standards of Prior Accident 
Evidence, 61 WASH. U. L. REV. 799, 800 n.5 (1983) (explaining that “to successfully carry 
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of evidence of nonparty harm is so common that courts developed an evidentiary 
rule allowing evidence of prior or subsequent accidents only if they are 
substantially similar to plaintiff’s injury.97  Generally, the other-accident evidence 
is admissible “if the facts and circumstances surrounding the other accidents are 
shown to be reasonably similar to those surrounding the plaintiff’s case, and the 
jury may consider any dissimilarities in evaluating the weight of the evidence.”98 
Although not as commonly associated with nonparty-harm evidence, a 
plaintiff wishing to establish a warning defect would also like to present this 
evidence. A warning defect exists if the defendant failed to warn about a 
foreseeable danger.99 What better way to show foreseeability than to show others 
were injured? “[T]he more numerous and serious the similar accidents caused by a 
product, the more likely it is that the manufacturer became (or should have 
become) aware of the product’s danger . . .”100 Just like with a design defect, it is to 
the plaintiff’s advantage to present evidence of nonparty harm—to show she is one 
of many injured.  
One clarifying point on the use of evidence of nonparty harm to establish 
defectiveness is worthwhile—that this use of evidence of nonparty harm does not 
pose the constitutional problems the Court identified in Philip Morris. This is 
because the defectiveness determination leads to the imposition of compensatory 
damages; Philip Morris was concerned about the jury’s use of nonparty harm as a 
basis for punitive damages. Different concerns exist for compensatory and punitive 
damages. Professor Owen explained:  
 
Because most companies are insured against such losses, and because 
they have greater access to much of the crucial evidence and greater 
financial resources with which to defend their cases, a little bias in favor 
                                                      
[the burden of proof that a product was defective], the plaintiff often needs to rely on prior 
accident evidence to establish a circumstantial inference of such a manufacturer’s defect” 
and that without that inference, the plaintiff’s case will likely be dismissed). 
97 OWEN, supra note 83, at 406.   
98 Id. at 407 (citation omitted). Courts frequently admit evidence of non-identical 
accidents. See, e.g., Exum v. General Elec. Co., 819 F.2d 1158, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(admitting evidence of other accidents involving the same model of fryer even though the 
accidents did not involve a foreign object dropped into the fryer as the plaintiff did); see 
Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 715 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Mass. 1999) (admitting evidence of other 
accidents even though they involved vans of different model years, different safety 
mechanisms, and the accidents did not occur on snow or ice); Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 
F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997) (admitting evidence of other accidents including one involving 
a different model of an electric potpourri pot); Bellinger v. Deere & Co., 881 F. Supp 813, 
818 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (admitting evidence of other accidents even though differences 
existed regarding how the victims came into contact with the defendant’s cornpicker); Joy 
v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (admitting evidence of 
other accidents even though failure of the product was due to wear and tear instead of 
defectiveness). 
99 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1(c). 
100 OWEN, supra note 83, at 405.  
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of compensating the injured user of a product may in fact be good. For 
even if a ‘close-call case’ is ‘wrongly’ rendered for the plaintiff, his 
suffering will be lessened, and the institutional ‘suffering’ of the 
manufacturer will be limited to the amount of the plaintiff’s actual loss, 
his compensatory damages. Only infrequently, and only in a few 
jurisdictions, will such ‘wrong’ decisions against a manufacturer reach 
one million dollars. We thus may wish to tolerate, and perhaps be able to 
afford, a little such compassion at the expense of some efficiency. The 
stakes are increased considerably, however, in both principle and 
amount, when claims are made for punitive damages. The presence of 
such claims places a premium on the oratorical and other trial skills of 
counsel in products cases, raising a special risk of tapping juror bias that 
may test the limits of fair adjudication.101 
 
These views are outdated. Punitive damages no longer create the stigma they 
once did,102 and they are often covered by insurance.103 Punitive damages are also 
more often subject to damage caps than compensatory damages.104 In addition, 
compensatory damage awards include pain and suffering damages, which, like 







                                                      
101 David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers 
of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1982) [hereinafter Owen, Problems in 
Assessing]. 
102 Jill Wieber Lens, Justice Holmes’s Bad Man and the Depleted Purposes of 
Punitive Damages, 101 KY. L.J. 789, 823 (2013) (“No longer does the public question the 
defendant’s integrity like the traditional stigma assumes. Instead, the public questions the 
legitimacy of the punitive damage award imposed.”). 
103 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 34 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (concluding that public policy supports insurability of 
punitive damages); Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1383, 1462 (2008) (“Currently, nine states prohibit the availability of insurance for punitive 
damages, but the majority of jurisdictions permit such insurance and about a dozen states 
have not decided conclusively through courts or statutes what the rule is.”). 
104 Elliot M. Kroll & James M. Westerlind, Arent Fox LLP Survey of Damage Laws 
of the 50 States Including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, ARENT FOX, LLP 
(2012), https://www.arentfox.com/sites/default/files/Downloads/practicesindustries/pract 
ices/AF-Survey-of-Damage-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK9H-XNG5] (according to a 
2012 survey, three states prohibit punitive damages and sixteen states cap their recovery, 
whereas only four states have a compensatory damage cap not specific to medical 
malpractice claims and fifteen states have a compensatory damage cap applicable only to 
medical malpractice claims). 
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 determination,” making them similarly susceptible to a good lawyer’s oratorical 
skills and difficult to defend regardless of financial resources.105 Regardless, the 
consideration of nonparty harm to determine defectiveness will only result in the 
awarding of compensatory damages, meaning Philip Morris concerns do not 
exist.106  
Private redress theories do not address the (constitutional) use of evidence of 
nonparty harm to establish defectiveness in a product defect claim. The theories 
acknowledge that evidence of nonparty harm can be relevant to punitive 
damages,107 but they underplay the importance of nonparty harm in establishing 
liability in a product defect claim, likely finding it inconsequential. For instance, 
Professor Zipursky admits the relevance of nonparty harm in establishing defect, 
but explains that “the act of risking is not the basis of liability;” instead “the act of 
tortiously injuring is the basis of liability.”108 But it is not so easy to separate the 
two. Because of the common law definitions of design and warning defect, the 
risky course of conduct injuring nonparties is a necessary, if not sufficient, part of 
the basis of liability. The injury to the individual plaintiff is tortious only if the 
product is defective and the product is likely defective only if nonparties are 
injured.109  
                                                      
105 Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if 
Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 862–63 (1999). 
106 Plus, it is possible that a dimension exists when considering nonparty harm to 
determine defectiveness—the substantial similarity dimension. It defines what other 
accidents can be considered. In fact, it is similar to the dimension set in State Farm: “A 
defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, 
may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422–23 (2003). The fact that courts routinely admit evidence of 
substantially similar nonparty harm to determine defect makes one wonder why the Court 
was so concerned about procedural protections in Philip Morris. 
107 Evidence of nonparty harm demonstrates that the defendant acted reprehensibly, 
but reprehensibly with respect to injuring the individual plaintiff. Evidence of nonparties 
injured by a defective television “demonstrate[s] the reprehensibility of the decision to go 
ahead and sell the defective product to the plaintiff.” Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra 
note 16, at 466; accord Sebok, supra note 16, at 1032 (explaining that evidence of nonparty 
harm is admissible only to the extent that it can be connected to the disrespect that the 
plaintiff suffered); Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22, at 1787–88 (discussing the 
distinction between admitting evidence to show “the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
wrong to the plaintiff herself” and admitting it to show “the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s wrongs to nonparties.”). 
108 Zipursky, Punitive Damages, supra note 28, at 145.  
109 Professor Christopher Robinette identifies products liability law as not fitting 
within civil recourse tort theory because of its instrumental goals. Christopher J. Robinette, 
Two Roads Diverge for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 543, 547–48 (2013) (“If an 
important reason courts created the legal wrong of strict products liability was to 
compensate and to deter, and strict products liability does, in fact, serve the goals of 
compensation and deterrence, it seems to me that at least a purpose of the law is to 
compensate and deter.”); see also Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is 
Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431, 471 (2011) (describing the instrumental goals in 
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Defectiveness’s dependence on nonparty harm also makes it difficult to apply 
some of Professor Sebok’s theory of punitive damages. He describes that a tort 
claim addresses: 1) the victim’s right to physical well-being (vindicated through 
compensatory damages) and 2) the victim’s right to respect of that right to physical 
well-being (vindicated through punitive damages).110 Sebok also states that these 
rights are personal.111 But an injured plaintiff likely has to establish nonparty harm 
to establish a defect. Using Sebok’s terms, an injured plaintiff has to establish the 
violation of those nonparties’ rights to physical well-being. And the injured 
plaintiff relies on those nonparties’ rights without their consent, making the rights 
less personal than they may seem.  
Professor Colby is the most outspoken in minimizing the importance of 
nonparty harm in establishing defect. In fact, he believes it “impossible” for an 
individual plaintiff to introduce evidence of nonparty harm:112  
  
                                                      
developing and reforming products liability law). Another reason defect claims may not fit 
so well within civil recourse theory is due to the dependence on nonparty harm. Under civil 
recourse theory, “for conduct to be tortious, it must not only be wrongful in some generic 
sense (i.e., antisocial) but also relationally wrongful—wrongful with respect to the victim 
who complains of the wrongdoing.” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort 
Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1137 (2007). The wrongful conduct for a 
design defect, though, is that the costs of all injuries likely to result from the defect 
outweighed the costs of an alternative design. The distinction between a stereotypical car 
accident negligence claim and defect claim is easy to see. Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky use that stereotypical example: “The reckless driver who hits the pedestrian has 
not only committed an antisocial act of a sort that entitles observers to condemn his actions 
and the state to sanction him; he has also wrongfully injured the victim. The victim is 
specially situated with regard to the driver’s actions . . . .” Id. at 1134. Moreover, the 
“driver has done something wrong to her that he has not done to anyone else.” Id. at 1135. 
If the product is defective, however, the manufacturer has done something wrong to the 
victim, but it’s done the same something wrong to many others. Is the manufacturer 
relationally wrongful to all those injured? Or is the manufacturer identically relationally 
wrongful to all injured? Either way, the wrong is very different than reckless driving 
injuring a pedestrian.  
110 Sebok, supra note 16, at 1026. 
111 Id. (explaining that because only the victim can correct that disrespect, the 
infliction of the punishment must be imposed in a tort claim brought by the injured 
plaintiff). 
112 Colby, supra note 10, at 654. 
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The other wrongs allegedly resulting from the same course of conduct 
will be treated only peripherally and painted with a very broad brush. 
The plaintiff will probably be permitted to introduce some very general, 
most likely statistical, evidence about these other wrongs, but, because 
the trial must necessarily center on the plaintiff’s case, no evidence will 
be introduced regarding the specifics of any of them. In all likelihood, no 
effort will be made to determine, for instance, how many of the other 
acts were genuinely wrongful, or how many of the other supposed 
injuries were legitimate, and were in fact caused by the defendant.113 
 
If the plaintiff’s claim is based on a product defect, though, the wrong done to 
the plaintiff—the defectiveness of the product—is only a wrong because it also 
injured others. Necessarily, evidence of nonparty harm will not be treated 
peripherally and broadly. In fact, both sides will introduce evidence of the specifics 
of other accidents. The plaintiff wants to demonstrate that the product injured 
nonparties in a way that is substantially similar to how the plaintiff is injured.114 
The defendant wants to demonstrate that the accidents were dissimilar to minimize 
the weight of the evidence.115  
The trial still “necessarily center[s] on the plaintiff’s case,”116 but nonparty 
harm is a crucial part of the plaintiff’s case. Not surprising given the breadth of 
evidence presented, a finding of liability—even though technically only liability to 
one plaintiff—is also broad. If the design is defective, then every product so 
designed or with the same inadequate warning is also defective.117 Courts pretend 
as if these broader effects do not exist. And, in a way, they are correct. The jury 
has impugned the design generally, but it is not as if the defendant is forced to alter 
the design or the warning. Plus, the breadth of the finding is not that the defendant 
is liable for all injuries caused by the defect. The defendant is liable only to the 
specific plaintiff for damages based on her injury. 
Still, the logical effects are broad, and ignoring the broader effect causes 
problems in the warning context. Warnings are thought to be very inexpensive.118 
When each jury weighs whether the defendant should have warned of danger A, 
                                                      
113 Id.  
114 See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1407–08 (10th Cir. 1988) (listing 
cases determining the substantial similarity of other accidents). 
115 See id. at 1408 (“Any differences in the accidents not affecting a finding of 
substantial similarity go to the weight of the evidence.”). 
116 Colby, supra note 10, at 654. 
117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
(explaining that if a design or warning defect is “found to exist, then every unit in same 
product line is potentially defective.”). If a warning is defective, every individual product 
with that warning is defective. Id.  If a defendant lied to the plaintiff about the product, then 
it lied to everyone.    
118 Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975) (“[T]he cost of giving an 
adequate warning is usually so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some 
more printing to a label . . . .”). 
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the jury is focused only on the nonexistent practical burden of adding language 
about A. But one jury finds liability for a failure to warn of A, another finds 
liability for a failure to warn of B, and so on. At some point, it is simply not 
practical for a warning to include all dangers.119 Plus, at some point, including any 
additional warnings will do more harm than good as consumers tend to disregard 
excessive warnings. But, “[e]ven a court [that] knows, in the abstract, that a limit 
will ultimately be reached, has no immediate sense of whether the case before it 
pushes the warning package beyond the appropriate constraints.”120   
Ultimately, the logically broad effect of a finding of a design or warning 
defect is due to the use of nonparty harm in establishing that same defect. 
Surprisingly, evidence of nonparty harm is actually the “primary focus of the 
dispute” over defectiveness121—something that private redress theories 
underestimate. 
 
B.  The Bigger Picture—Reprehensibly Injuring Many Nonparties 
 
By definition, a defective product means many injured nonparties.122 This 
context could present issues for imposing punitive damages in claims based on 
product defect.123 As commentators pointed out, punitive damages “evolved in the 
context of a one-on-one relationship.”124  
                                                      
119 Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“If every 
foreseeable possibility must be covered, ‘[T]he list of foolish practices warned against 
would be so long, it would fill a volume.’”). 
120 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products 
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L REV. 265, 301 (1990). 
121 Colby, supra note 10, at 654. 
122 See supra Part III.A. 
123 Some questioned whether allowing punitive damages was logically consistent with 
a strict liability claim. See, e.g., Forrest L. Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products 
Liability, 39 INS. COUNS. J. 300, 301 (1972) (explaining that in strict liability “the character 
of the defendant’s act is of no consequence,” but “in the punitive damages claim the 
character of the act is paramount.”). Commentators and courts rejected this problem 
relatively quickly because the entitlement to punitive damages is usually proven by facts of 
culpability, which are usually different than the facts “supporting the underlying claim for 
compensatory damages.” David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability 
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1269 (1976) [hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages in 
Products]; see also Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 833 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“[T]here is no theoretical problem in a jury finding that a defendant is liable because of the 
defectiveness of a product and then judging the conduct of the defendant in order to 
determine whether punitive damages should be awarded on the basis of ‘outrageous 
conduct’ in light of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.” (quoting Neal v. Carey Canadian 
Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.Pa. 1982))); id. at 835 (“The fact that some sellers 
therefore will be found liable in the absence of fault does not mean that those who are at 
fault—and outrageously so—should not be punished.”). In short, the incompatibility 
argument did not have any merit.  
124 James D. Ghiardi & Natalie B. Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 
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That one-on-one relationship, however, does not usually exist in a modern 
products liability claim. Instead, a modern manufacturer sells the defective product 
to many. If the defendant acted reprehensibly, the defendant’s “evil conduct at 
issue exists not with respect to any particular person, but rather with respect to that 
class of persons who have been or will be exposed to the product.”125 An 
individual can obtain punitive damages if she can show evil conduct, even though 
the evil conduct was “towards a much larger group of people”126 and had “little to 
do with the particular plaintiff.”127 The generality of the defendant’s conduct also 
leaves “no compelling reason why a particular plaintiff should receive the punitive 
damages award, any more than any other plaintiff who has been injured by the 
product.”128 And if “[e]very person injured thereby may make an independent 
claim for punitive damages”129 punitive damages “may be repetitively imposed for 
a single course of conduct.”130 Judge Henry Friendly famously wondered “how 
claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation 
can be so administered as to avoid overkill.”131 Professor David Owen initially 
disagreed,132 but later expressed concerns similar to Judge Friendly: “[T]he 
experience of the past several years has raised questions whether the punitive 
damages doctrine is being abused in products cases, whether some manufacturers 
are being punished who should not be, and whether penalties, though appropriately 
assessed, are sometimes unfairly large.”133 
                                                      
61 MARQ. L. REV. 245, 248 (1977). 
125 Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability: An Essay in 
Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REV. 505, 516–17 (1994) (explaining that if the defendant “made a 
reprehensible design decision[,]” that decision “was equally reprehensible with respect to 
all of those adversely affected by the product.”). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 516. 
129 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 145–46 (1986).  
130 Id.; see also id. at 146 (“In this way, the defendant may be punished ten or twenty 
or a hundred times over, in cumulations so extravagant and destructive as to defy any 
rational justification and to threaten the civil extinction of major business entities.”); James 
B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 
37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1142 (1984) (“If punitive damages may be awarded repeatedly for 
the same design or marketing deficiency, then indeed, the punitive damage doctrine may be 
utilized to punish a product supplier to the point of economic destruction.”). 
131 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).  
132 The practical problems identified here and by Judge Friendly gained some 
traction, but were mostly laid to rest in 1976 when Professor David Owen published his 
influential law review article advocating the imposition. See generally Owen, Punitive 
Damages in Products, supra note 123. 
133 Owen, Problems in Assessing, supra note 101, at 59. Despite these concerns, 
punitive damages are widely available in punitive damages claims today. 3 OWEN & DAVIS 
ON PROD. LIAB. § 26:20 (4th ed.). One commentator noted that the damages are most often 
awarded when: 
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Private redress theories address some of these concerns directly. First, private 
redress theories empower the individual victim whom the manufacturer 
disrespected.134 It empowers the injured victim to right that disrespect by pursuing 
and obtaining punitive damages. Only the injured victim can file a lawsuit to right 
that disrespect. Thus, there is a compelling reason why one plaintiff receives 
punitive damages—to right that disrespect. Even if the manufacturer also 
disrespected many others, the manufacturer disrespected the particular victim who 
sues and that victim is thus entitled to seek punitive relief. 
Second, private redress theories theoretically prevent the defendant from 
being punished over and over for the exact same thing. If punitive damage awards 
can punish the defendant only for the private wrong to the plaintiff, then multiple 
potentially overlapping punishments should not occur. The defendant can still be 
punished for its multiple private wrongs committed against different victims, but 
each award is specific to that private wrong. 
But private redress theories do not otherwise address the broader context of a 
product defect claim with its many victims. They do not address the fact that if the 
manufacturer acted reprehensibly in selling a defective product, that conduct “was 
equally reprehensible with respect to all of those adversely affected by the 
product.”135 Similarly, the theories do not address whether those many victims’ 
punitive damage claims and awards should relate. 
  
IV.  IDENTICAL PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
 
Private redress theories, and Philip Morris, do not contemplate the possibility 
of identical punitive damage awards. That is likely partially because the theories 
                                                      
 
Four factors consistently appear in the reported cases that have addressed the 
question of punitive damages in strict products liability actions. First, the cases 
generally find some corporate knowledge of the danger posed by the design of 
the product. Second, the cases reveal knowledge by corporate agents that the 
defect has caused injuries to persons other than the person involved in the 
present litigation. Third, there is generally some sort of procrastination on the 
part of the corporation in remedying the defect or in warning the public of the 
defect. Finally, a number of cases note that alternative designs would have been 
economically feasible. 
 
Richard D. Schuster, Punitive Damage Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The 
Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 771, 774 (1981). See also Owen, 
Punitive Damages in Products, supra note 123, at 1329 (explaining that juries commonly 
impose punitive damages in products liability claims involving “(1) fraudulent-type 
misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety standards; (3) inadequate testing and 
manufacturing procedures; (4) failures to warn of known dangers before marketing; and (5) 
post-marketing failures to remedy known dangers.”). 
134 Michael L. Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-as-Redress, and Constitutional Torts, 
46 GA. L. REV 1003, 1005 (2012). 
135 Wertheimer, supra note 125, at 517. 
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mandate personalization of the punitive damage award to the disrespect that the 
individual plaintiff suffered; personalization naturally leads to nonidentical awards.  
But what if disrespect is identical? With respect to product defects, the 
manufacturer disrespected the victims’ rights when it knew of the probable injury, 
yet still sold the product. The knowledge was generally directed to the many 
possible victims. Absent special circumstances, the manufacturer was not aware of 
any greater chance to one potential victim over another. Instead, the manufacturer 
disrespected each eventual victim identically. The only difference between the 
many victims is their amount of compensatory damages. The factors that determine 
compensatory damages—pre-injury occupation, pre-existing medical conditions, 
emotional state—however, were unknown to the manufacturer and thus could not 
have affected the manufacturer’s disrespect. Despite their differing compensatory 
damages, the manufacturer disrespected each of its victims identically and should 
pay identical punitive damage awards to each. The collection of identical punitive 
damage awards then represents punishment for the defendant’s knowingly injuring 
many by selling a defective product. 
Even if appropriate, identical punitive damage awards for product defect 
claims will not be easy to achieve. The current system of jury-imposed punitive 
damages is incapable of producing identical awards. Likely the only way to 
achieve identical awards for product defects is through legislatively created 
hierarchies of fault. Legislative involvement to create a system of identical 
punitive damages in product defect claims is also consistent with private redress 
theories. 
 
A.  Identifying the Disrespect 
 
Professors Colby, Zipursky, and Sebok point to products liability punitive 
damage awards as examples of awards inconsistent with private redress theory. 
Professor Colby points to a $28 billion “total harm” punitive damage award in a 
tobacco case, stating that “no rational justice system could possibly mete out that 
kind of penalty for harming a single person, no matter how severe the suffering 
and how reprehensible the wrongdoing.”136 Professor Zipursky cites BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore,137 describing “how absurd it is to suppose that Dr. Gore is 
entitled to redress the fraud perpetrated upon him by exacting a $2 million penalty 
from BMW.”138 And Professor Sebok criticizes an attorney’s arguments that a 
punitive damage award needed to be large enough to gain enough publicity to 
notify owners of a car’s danger and to effectively “force Ford to recall 
[vehicles].”139  
                                                      
136 Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 16, at 397.  
137 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
138 Zipursky, supra note 16, at 162. Zipursky also criticizes the use of punitive 
damages in products liability claims to “fill this regulatory void” as an (unconstitutional) 
noncompliance sanction. Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22, at 1783. 
139 Sebok, supra note 16, at 1034. See Jill Wieber Lens, Product Recalls: Why Is Tort 
Law Deferring to Agency Inaction?, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 347, n. 76 (2016) 
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These examples do not, however, answer the question of what should a 
punitive damage award in a product defect claim look like if consistent with 
private redress theories. Fortunately, Professor Sebok provided analogous 
historical examples to help identify the manufacturer’s disrespect in a products 
liability claim. His first example is fraud between a seller and buyer.140 Punitive 
damages were appropriate because of the defendant’s “specific desire . . . to use 
the power he had over the victim (usually knowledge of the true state of things, 
which, if the defendant had shared with the victim, would have led the victim to 
walk away from the fraudulent deal).”141 The defendant’s conduct “suggested a 
                                                      
(discussing that very few states have adopted liability for a failure to recall a product); see, 
e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 511 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[o]nly evidence 
which is relevant to the conduct for which liability is imposed can support an award of 
punitive damages.”); Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1016 (D. Minn. 
2003) (refusing punitive damages based on the manufacturer’s failure “to institute a 
product recall, or retrofit” because Minnesota law did not recognize such duties); 
Bushmaker v. A. W. Chesterton Co., No. 09-CV-726-slc, 2013 WL 11079371, at *7 (W.D. 
Wis. Mar. 1, 2013) (“If, as defendant argues here, a defendant cannot be liable at all for a 
post-sale failure to warn, then it would follow that it would be improper to consider 
evidence of such conduct in the punitive damages assessment.”); Cameron v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. CIV.A. 504CV24JMH, 2005 WL 2674990, at *9 (E.D. Ky. 
Oct. 20, 2005) (explaining that the state “does not recognize a post-sale failure to warn. 
Therefore, the plaintiff’s evidence of the defendant's post-sale conduct has to be relevant to 
the design defect claim in order to warrant an award of punitive damages.”); see also 
Rustad, supra note 75, at 66 (explaining that in 75% of the products liability punitive 
damage awards in his empirical study were the result of the defendants’ failure to warn 
before sale or “postmarketing failures to remedy known dangers.”). Regardless of 
consistency with private redress theory, basing punitive damages on a failure to recall a 
product is likely unconstitutional. That is because the failure to recall is generally not a 
basis for tort liability. Per Philip Morris, a punitive damage award can punish the defendant 
only for what it did to the plaintiff. The failure to recall the product is not, per tort law, how 
the defendant injured the plaintiff. If tort law does not recognize liability for injury due to 
the failure to recall, then tort law cannot constitutionally punish the same conduct. Some 
courts have recognized the problem with basing punitive damages on the failure to recall 
the product. But see Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir. 
1985) (refusing a jury instruction creating liability for the failure to recall the product and 
instead “suggest[ing] to appellants’ counsel that failure to recall could be argued with 
respect to the punitive damage issue.”); Hackethal v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 
4:15CV01398 ERW, 2016 WL 695615, at *2 (E.D. Miss. Feb. 22, 2016) (striking 
allegations of negligence based on failure to recall/retrofit the product because Missouri 
law doesn’t recognize such a duty, but refusing to strike allegations that Plaintiff was 
entitled to punitive damages because of the failure to recall/retrofit); Reed v. Ford Motor 
Co., 679 F. Supp. 873, 880 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (stating that although no liability exists for the 
defendant’s failure to recall the product, “Ford’s failure to voluntarily recall its product is 
but one manifestation of the defendant’s recklessness—a recklessness that entitles [the 
plaintiff] to damages.”). 
140 Sebok, supra note 16, at 1012–13. 
141 Id. at 1013. 
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conscious disdain of the victim, especially when, as the courts noted, there were 
differences in social or economic power between the parties.”142 Sebok also 
described that, historically, punitive damages were appropriate where “parties used 
commercial relationships as a vehicle for the exercise and abuse of economic 
power.”143 The examples Sebok gives are railroad and trolley companies found 
liable for punitive damages when they knew of or ratified their employees’ 
mistreatment of passengers.144 The companies ignored the mistreatment “because 
they felt that it was not to their advantage to act, it was costly to respond to the 
plaintiff’s complaint, and it was (hopefully) cost-free to ignore the complaint.”145 
Punitive damages were imposed based on the “defendant’s unequal or unfair 
treatment of the plaintiff.”146 
These examples are similar to the modern-day basis for punitive damages in 
products liability claims. The first is a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, a type of 
claim in which punitive damages are still common today. But the conduct can also 
be present in a defect claim; the defendant has power over the victim because of its 
knowledge of the probable injury. By still selling, the manufacturer consciously 
disdains that chance of injury. The second example is also analogous to the 
willfulness or recklessness that could accompany a design defect. The 
manufacturer was aware of a potential danger in its design, but believed it was 
advantageous to keep that design due to costs. Thus, the manufacturer knew of risk 
the product posed, but consciously disregarded it. 
In both examples, just as manufacturers do today, the defendant consciously 
disdained the victim’s right to physical safety and well-being. When lying to users 
or disregarding known risks, manufacturers consciously disdain private rights to 
physical safety and well-being. The manufacturer determines that the injured 
plaintiff’s primary private rights “are not worthy of respect.”147 That is the 
disrespect that an individual injured plaintiff can personally correct by suing and 
recovering punitive damages in her product defect claim. 
 
B.  Identical Disrespect—Despite Victims’ Individual Differences 
 
Victims injured by defective products are not carbon copies of each other. 
They will be injured in different ways and suffer different damages. For instance, 
one plaintiff may have acted unreasonably in using the product to such an extent 
that state law bars her recovery.148 Or, the defendant may be able to prove that a 
                                                      
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1011–12. 
144 Id. at 1012. 
145 Id. Professor Zipursky also describes that his private redress conception of 
punitive damages is similar to the role described in these same early English tort cases. 
Zipursky, Palsgraf, supra note 22, at 1779. 
146 Sebok, supra note 16, at 1012. 
147 Id. at 1014. 
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). See, e.g., 
Tillman v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1353–54 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (applying 
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plaintiff would not have obeyed an adequate warning, precluding the plaintiff from 
showing cause-in-fact.149 Thus, not every victim injured by a defective product will 
even be able to establish the manufacturer’s liability to her.150 
Additionally, victims’ injuries will differ. If a defective vehicle is likely to 
start on fire, victims are likely to suffer burns. Some of those victims may get 
lucky, however. For instance, some may escape the vehicle early and suffer only 
smoke inhalation. Others will suffer the expected burns. Still, others may suffer 
worse; maybe due to pre-existing conditions, the burns the victims suffer will be 
unexpectedly fatal.  
Victims’ compensatory damage amounts will differ. Some of this is 
attributable to different injuries—e.g., smoke inhalation or death.151 But amounts 
of compensatory damages will likely also differ even when the injuries are more 
similar. Compensatory damages will include past and future medical expenses, 
past and future lost wages, and past and future pain and suffering.152 Thus, 
compensatory damages are based on the plaintiff’s personal circumstances—the 
extent of harm, the actual costs of the medical treatment the plaintiff received 
and/or will receive, possible adjustments based on insurance coverage, her 
occupation before the injury, her salary before the injury, her likely career 
trajectory before the injury, her extent of pain and suffering since the injury and 
the likelihood that it will continue post injury. Even if two plaintiffs suffer the 
exact same injury, like corneal ulcers, their compensatory damages can 
dramatically differ because they are based on each plaintiff’s personal 
circumstances. Ordinarily, identical compensatory damage awards for plaintiffs 
injured by a defective product should not occur. 
These differences exist, and will matter to the manufacturer at the time of 
trial. Some plaintiffs will be unable to establish liability. But if they are successful 
and seek punitive damages,153 the focus switches to the manufacturer’s 
                                                      
Florida law).  
149 See Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exporters Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 879–80 (3d Cir. 
1998).  
150 See Philip Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (giving examples of reasons a 
defendant may not be liable in tort to nonparty victims). 
151 The eggshell plaintiff rule mandates that the defendant would have to pay damages 
based on the death resulting from the defective product even though the death was 
unforeseeable. Lens, supra note 67, at 40–41 (“The eggshell plaintiff rule famously 
mandates compensation for damages worsened due to a plaintiff’s pre-existing condition, 
even though the extent of the injury is unforeseeable. As an example, if a plaintiff has a 
heart condition making her more susceptible to stress, a simple assault based on scaring the 
plaintiff may end up causing a heart attack. The defendant will pay damages based on 
causing that heart attack even though it was unforeseeable.”). 
152 Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 279, 302 (D.D.C. 2003). 
153 Arguably, the manufacturer disrespected victims injured by the defective product 
even if the victim could not establish liability for compensatory damages because of her 
own fault or because of her inability to establish causation. But if liability is not 
established, then the defendant did not injure the plaintiff in a way recognized by tort and 
thus any disrespect cannot be redressed through punitive damages. 
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reprehensible conduct—the selling of a product it knows will probably cause 
injury. At that point, the many differences between the victims cannot be a part of 
that disrespect; the manufacturer did not know of those differences. The 
manufacturer’s reprehensible conduct was directed at the entire “class of persons 
who have been or will be exposed to the product.”154 It did not know specifics 
about persons within that class and thus it could not have known the compensatory 
damages a victim would suffer.155 Necessarily, the manufacturer was “equally 
reprehensible with respect to all of those adversely affected by the product.”156 
Each victim injured by the defective product suffered the same, identical 
disrespect.  
Professor Colby acknowledged the possibility of identical disrespect, but 
discounted it: “[E]ven if the defendant’s conduct toward one plaintiff calls for 
punitive damages, it may not follow that the defendant should be punished (or 
punished to the same degree) for the wrongs done to all of those who were harmed 
by its actions.”157 He offers an example: a defendant’s “conduct toward customers 
who purchased the product . . . before the company was aware of the defect” is far 
less culpable than “a defendant’s conduct toward customers who purchased its 
product at a time when the defendant knew and concealed evidence that the 
product was defective.”158  
Professor Colby’s example is correct. Customers who purchased the product 
before the manufacturer knew of the danger may be able to establish liability for 
compensatory damages, but not entitlement to punitive damages. These customers 
suffered no disrespect as the defendant acted, at worst, negligently. But the 
manufacturer disrespected the customers who purchased after the manufacturer 
became aware of the defect and those customers would be entitled to punitive 
damages. Notably, those customers were disrespected to the same degree. Even 
Professor Colby’s example is one of victims suffering identical disrespect. 
Professor Colby offers another example: “A bogus telephone psychic, for 
example, commits a much more culpable act by telling a desperate and exploitable 
                                                      
154 Wertheimer, supra note 125, at 516.  
155 Additionally, the level of disrespect does not vary depending on the victim’s 
emotional distress. “Disrespect of the plaintiff’s rights may produce strong emotional 
reactions on her part, or it may not . . . . Still, courts would understand that the attitude of 
disrespect instantiated by the defendant produced an injury that was independent of the 
emotional distress the plaintiff may or may not have suffered.” Sebok, supra note 16, at 
1016. See also id. at 1018 (“Moral injury is not a physical harm, nor even the psychological 
pain that one might experience after being the object of a moral injury.”). Id. (“[O]ne can 
suffer an injury to one’s dignity without subjectively suffering (one might be made of stern 
stuff).”).  
156 Wertheimer, supra note 125, at 517.  
157 Colby, supra note 10, at 600–01. Colby also brings up that the defendant’s level of 
culpability differs if it sold the product “after the dangers associated with the product 
became common knowledge.” Id. at 600. If the dangers are widely known, the product may 
not even be defective as widely known dangers likely mean that no alternative design exists 
for the product. 
158 Id.  
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victim of domestic violence that, according to the stars, her abuser will change his 
ways, than by telling a lovelorn college student that someday he will meet a tall, 
dark stranger.”159 Different levels of disrespect may exist in this example—the 
psychic disrespected the victim of domestic violence to a greater extent. But only if 
the psychic knew of the different vulnerabilities. If the psychic did not know, then 
the psychic disrespected both victims identically by knowing that the statement 
was fraudulent and disregarding their rights to emotional well-being. Recklessness, 
the standard triggering the availability of punitive damages, is subjective.160 The 
defendant must have subjectively known of the high chance of severe injury.161 
Similarly, the defendant must have subjectively known of the vulnerability.162  
In most product defect cases, a manufacturer will not know of differences 
between victims. The manufacturer has no relationship with the purchasers of its 
products, and it certainly has no relationship with bystander victims. Without a 
relationship, it is impossible to know a victim’s pre-injury occupation, pre-existing 
medical conditions, or tolerance for pain and suffering or emotional distress. If the 
manufacturer does not know of its victims’ personal characteristics, then those 
characteristics cannot be relevant to the extent of the manufacturer’s disrespect.163  
                                                      
159 Colby, supra note 10, at 601.  
160 Gregory A. Williams, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction upon Punitive 
Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless Conduct, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 551, 570 (1987). 
161 Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 480–82 (1909). 
162 The Supreme Court has not expressly declared this, but in State Farm, a case 
where the defendant did take advantage of financially vulnerable plaintiffs, that subjective 
knowledge of vulnerability is clear. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 433 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for affirmance of the punitive 
damage award based on the trial court’s reliance of “the testimony of several former State 
Farm employees affirming that they were trained to target ‘the weakest of the herd’”); see 
also Brand Marketing Group LLC v. Intertek Testing Services, N.A., Inc., 801 F.3d 347, 
364 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding reprehensibility based on defendant’s attempts to exploit the 
plaintiff’s financial vulnerability); Krysa v. Paine, 176 S.W.3d 150, 160 (W.D. Mo. 2005) 
(explaining that targeting financially vulnerable victims shows reprehensibility); Wooley v. 
Lucksinger, 61 So.3d 507, 635 (La. 2011) (finding reprehensible conduct because of the 
defendant’s knowledge of and its motivation to take advantage of financially vulnerable 
victims). Logically, it is impossible to target vulnerability without also knowing of that 
vulnerability. Additionally, the other factors the Court identified as relevant to 
reprehensibility are within the defendant’s subjective knowledge/control—whether 
 
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct 
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of 
others . . . the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and 
the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere 
accident. 
 
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419.  
163 Professor Sebok seems to admit so within his own criticism of the reasonable 
relationship guidepost, labeling the mention of single-digit multipliers “the most regrettable 
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It is possible that the manufacturer targeted one set of consumers, or that the 
manufacturer knew that one segment of the population would be at greater risk of 
injury.164 Suppose the manufacturer knew that its product could spontaneously 
combust and cause dramatic burns. Also suppose that the manufacturer knew that 
the product’s likely users include both illiterate and literate users, and that the 
manufacturer warned the product was flammable, but not explosive, and did not 
include pictorial warnings. The defendant likely disrespected the private rights of 
illiterate plaintiffs more so than the literate ones. The illiterate plaintiffs were not 
warned at all. The literate plaintiffs were warned, but maybe not adequately. 
Assuming liability, these different levels of disrespect should produce different 
levels of disrespect between literate plaintiffs and illiterate plaintiffs. However, all 
the literate injured plaintiffs suffered identical disrespect, and all the illiterate 
injured plaintiffs suffered identical disrespect. 
In most cases of reprehensible conduct, all the manufacturer knows is the 
probable injury. If a defective engine design is likely to cause the car to start on 
fire in a rear-end collision, many are likely to suffer burns of varying degrees. Or, 
if a warning is defective because it failed to warn of the risk that contact lenses 
could cause corneal ulcers, then many are likely to suffer corneal ulcers. These 
similar injuries are why plaintiffs can establish proximate cause in the first place—
it was foreseeable that the defective product would injure them in this way.165  
                                                      
[words] ever written about punitive damages.” Sebok, supra note 16, at 1029. See also 
Professor Anthony Sebok, After Philip Morris v. Williams: What Is Left of the “Single-
Digit” Ratio?, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 293 (2008) (“It is not clear what purpose or 
value the ratio rule has at this point.”). But see Colby, supra note 10, at 639 (pointing to the 
ratio rule as evidence of the need for a private-focused punitive damage award and labeling 
the requirement “a direct remnant of the historical conception of punitive damages”). 
Professors Colby and Zipursky have not criticized the ratio guidepost the same way. 
164 See Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Joint Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Stanley Indus., Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Fla. 
1992) (No. 89-1840-CIV) (noting that the defendants targeted the Hispanic population 
through the use of the Hispanic media).  
165 The extent of the injuries may differ among injured victims, but if the victims are 
able to establish proximate cause, then, under the majority rule, those victims were able to 
establish that their general type of injury was foreseeable given the defective product. See, 
e.g., Hooper v. Cty. of Cook, 851 N.E.2d 663, 669 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006) (“Although the 
foreseeability of an injury will establish legal cause, the extent of the injury or the exact 
way in which it occurs need not be foreseeable.”); Powers v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 625 
So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“[I]t is not necessary that the tort-feasor be able 
to foresee the exact nature and extent of the injuries, but all that is necessary for liability to 
arise is that the tort-feasor be able to see that some injury will likely result in some manner 
as a consequence of his negligent acts.”). This is the same type of generalizing of the 
foreseeable injury that administrative agencies do when determining whether to set a safety 
standard for a product or whether to order a product recall. See Southland Mower Co. v. 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 619 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir. 1980) (generalizing the types 
of injuries caused by lawnmowers necessitating the agency’s safety standard for walk 
behind lawn mowers); U.S. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
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Assuming victims can prove liability and entitlement to punitive damages, 
private redress theories then mandate punitive damages be based on the 
manufacturer’s disrespecting the victims. But the manufacturer disrespected each 
of those victims identically. If punitive damages are based on that disrespect, then 
the injured victims should recover identical punitive damage awards. 
 
C.  Fixing the Reversed Disconnect Private Redress Theory Creates 
 
Private redress theories are attractive because they fix the perceived 
disconnect between an individual tort claim and a punitive damage award—in an 
individual tort claim brought by just one plaintiff injured by a defective product, 
how is the defendant punished for $62 million?166 This is the disconnect Professors 
Colby, Zipursky, and Sebok focus on.  
As a part of his private redress theory, Colby attempts to explain that 
disconnect by distinguishing the public wrong—which juries were improperly 
punishing—and the private wrong—which juries should have been punishing. He 
uses the example of a criminal assault to illustrate the difference. The individual 
victim has a tort claim. But that assault also causes a public harm: it “disturb[s] the 
peace and violate[s] the social order.”167 A murder or rape “makes us all feel less 
secure”168 and “makes us afraid for our own safety.”169 The criminal punishment 
punishes this public wrong,170 and tort law can punish the private wrong to the 
individual, “one consequence”171 of the public wrong. The two punishments are 
“imposed as a consequence of the same wrongful act,”172 but “serve distinct 
punitive goals.”173  
Professor Colby also applies his public-private distinction to product defect 
claims. He believes that punitive damages in these claims attempt to punish the 
manufacturer for causing public harm174—for making all of us less secure and 
more afraid for our safety due to the possibility of accidents caused by defective 
                                                      
(affirming agency’s recall order based on finding that some cars were likely to “burst into 
flames” due to defect).   
166 Kim Bell, St. Louis Jury Orders Johnson & Johnson to Pay $72 Million in Talcum 
Powder Cancer Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com 
/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-jury-orders-johnson-johnson-to-pay-million-in/article 
_26e6046c-f97d-5a6d-a879-a97535dd78bc.html [https://perma.cc/8JH7-N3SQ].   
167 Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 16, at 424.  
168 Id. at 426. 
169 Id. Colby also accurately points out that this public wrong can occur “in the 
absence of an individual victim.” Id. at 427. Even if a drunk driver does not injure anyone, 
he has endangered the public and made the public feel less secure, and can face criminal 
punishment. Id. 
170 Id. at 426. 
171 Id. at 423. 
172 Id. at 440. 
173 Id. 
174 Colby, supra note 10, at 584. 
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products.175 That is how one jury could impose a $62 million punishment for the 
defendant injuring one plaintiff. By narrowing the scope of the punitive damages 
to providing just the individual plaintiff redress, a $62 million award (presumably) 
should not occur. Instead, the punitive damage award will be limited to providing 
the plaintiff redress just as the compensatory damage award is limited to 
compensating the plaintiff for her injuries. 
But in the context of product defect claims, a private redress conception of 
punitive damages creates a new, reversed disconnect. The punitive damage award 
is now constitutionally limited to the private wrong—the disrespect the plaintiff 
suffered. But the liability for the product defect is not so limited. The basis for that 
liability is much broader—the jury likely determined that the defendant’s product 
injured nonparties. Even the basis for the private redress punitive damage award is 
much broader—the jury likely determined that the defendant knew of the probable 
injury to all exposed to the product, broad knowledge that “had little to do with the 
particular plaintiff.”176 Thus, a new disconnect exists. Individualized punitive 
damages, yet broader notions of product defect and reprehensible conduct 
triggering those punitive damages.  
The question, then, is how to construct a punitive damage award that punishes 
the disrespect that the plaintiff suffered, yet still reflects the breadth of the 
manufacturer’s conduct, the injured nonparties, and the manufacturer’s general 
knowledge of the probable injury to many.  
The answer is identical punitive damage awards for those victims injured by 
the same defective product. The manufacturer generally disrespected potential 
                                                      
175 If jurors were doing so, it would fill a void; no current mechanism exists to 
address the public wrong that a defective product causes. Criminal law punishes public 
wrongs, but very few examples of criminal punishment for defective products exist. See 
Rustad, supra note 75, at 73 (of over 350 punitive damage awards studied between 1965–
1990, only one defendant was criminally sanctions). Tort law also cannot punish this public 
wrong. Even if people are at risk, no tort claims exists until someone is actually injured. 
Frank v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 292 A.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (denying class 
certification due to lack of injury when proposed class members were merely at risk of 
“neck and back injuries, paraplegia, quadriplegia, and even death” due to possibility of seat 
malfunction in the event of a rear-end collision).  
The mechanism that comes closest to addressing the public wrong created by a 
defective product is agency regulation. But agencies rarely impose fines. See Rustad, supra 
note 75, at 73 (of over 350 punitive damage awards studied between 1965–1990, only 
eleven “defendants received some form of penalty from a local, state, or federal agency”). 
Regardless, agencies can only impose civil fines, the main purpose of which is usually not 
punishment. Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 16, at 454 (explaining that the 
Supreme “Court often finds . . . that the civil penalty is in reality simply a form of rough 
compensation to the government for the cost of enforcing the law, rather than an attempt to 
penalize the defendant for violating the law, and thus the penalty is really remedial, and is 
not punishment at all.”). See also 49 C.F.R. § 578.2 (2016) (empowering the NHTSA to 
impose civil fines “to effectuate the remedial impact of civil penalties and to foster 
compliance with the law”).   
176 Wertheimer, supra note 125, at 515–16. 
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victims when it knew of the probable general type of injury, yet still sold the 
product. Each injured victim can pursue punitive damages to correct that 
disrespect. Yet, each injured victim was disrespected identically, and the 
manufacturer should pay those injured victims identical punitive damage awards.  
The collection of individual punitive damage awards then represents the many 
private injuries that made the product defective. It also represents punishment for 
the many private wrongs. Professor Colby believes that juries were punishing the 
product manufacturer for the public wrong caused by a product defect, but what is 
likely happening is that juries are punishing the product manufacturer for the 
collection of private wrongs. In Philip Morris, the plaintiff’s attorney refers not to 
the general risk to society, but instead to other individual smokers; the Oregon 
Supreme Court upheld the $80 million punitive damage award partly because 
Philip Morris’s conduct “caused a significant number of deaths each year in 
Oregon.”177 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,178 the jury likely calculated 
$4 million punitive damages by multiplying the actual damages to each car, 
$4,000, by the 1,000 cars BMW had fraudulently sold as new.179 Juries have 
already been attempting to punish the defendant for the collection of private 
wrongs committed. This practice should continue consistent with private redress 
theory, through individual, identical punitive damage awards. 
 
D.  Creating A System of Identical Awards 
 
Two issues arise with creating such a system of identical punitive damage 
awards. The first issue arises with any private redress theory—how to monetarily 
value the manufacturer’s disrespect of the plaintiff. There is no easy answer. 
Before the introduction of private redress theories, courts and academics struggled 
with the jury’s process of determining the proper punitive damage award.180 
Private redress theories limit that discretion by specifically identifying what the 
punitive damage award can punish—the manufacturer’s disrespect of the 
individual plaintiff. But none of Sebok, Colby, or Zipursky set out to provide 
guidance on how to translate that disrespect into a dollar amount.181   
                                                      
177 Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1170 (Or. 2006). 
178 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
179 Id. at 609.  
180 Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the 
History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 206 (2003). 
181 Professor Sebok specifically explained that the purpose of his article is not to 
“set[] out a rule or formula for their calculation or for reviewing them on appeal.” Sebok, 
supra note 16, at 1030. Professor Colby explained that his theory will allow appellate 
courts to “strik[e] down awards that would be . . . excessive as punishment for the 
individual tort[,]” but offered no more specific guidance. Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra 
note, 16, at 467. The only specific numbers Professor Zipursky discussed were with respect 
to BMW, explaining that $2 million was too much punishment, but that $4,000 was likely 
too little. Zipursky, supra note 16, at 168–69. 
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This Article introduces a second issue, however—the need for identical 
punitive damage awards in product defect claims where the manufacturer 
disrespected each individual victim identically. Although not necessarily 
constitutionally required, such consistency is certainly desirable.182 The Court said 
so in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,183 explaining that “[c]ourts of law are 
concerned with fairness as consistency.”184 Consistency in punishment is also 
required by the rule of law, which ensures that law dictates the results as opposed 
to the decision maker.185 
In Exxon, the Court anecdotally highlighted the inconsistent results produced 
by the current system: one Alabama jury awarded one plaintiff $4 million in 
punitive damages based on a fraudulent misrepresentation, but another Alabama 
jury awarded no punitive damages to another plaintiff who relied on the same 
fraudulent misrepresentation.186 
This Article calls for a system that will help create consistency—where 
victims injured by the same defective product receive an identical punitive damage 
award because they suffered identical disrespect. Numerous practical difficulties 
make this system difficult to achieve. 
This is not possible under the current system of jury imposition of punitive 
damage awards. Assuming plaintiffs injured by a defect product sue, a different 
jury will hear each individual claim. Juries allowed to impose punitive damages 
may decline. If juries choose to impose punitive damages, and even if properly 
instructed to punish the private wrong, those juries will likely value that private 
wrong differently.187 The awards will not be consistent. 
                                                      
182 See Lens, supra note 67, at 27–31. Others have commented on the desirability of 
consistent punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational 
Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 295 (1997) (“If 
punitive damages were fashioned to fit the infraction, we would expect identical wrongs to 
garner identical penalties.”).  
183 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
184 Id. at 499. 
185 See Lens, supra note 67, at 27–29 (discussing the rule of law’s need for 
consistency and predictability). 
186 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500 (discussing that after BMW, 
a “second Alabama case with strikingly similar facts produced ‘a comparable amount of 
compensatory damages’ but ‘no punitive damages at all.’”). 
187 Id. at 501 (“We are aware of no scholarly work pointing to consistency across 
punitive awards in cases involving similar claims and circumstances.”); see also id. at 504 
(doubting whether jury instructions could “promot[e] systemic consistency when awards 
are not tied to specifically proven items of damage” partially based on the Court’s 
“experience with attempts to produce consistency in the analogous business of criminal 
sentencing” where it concluded that only “a quantified approach will work.”); Pac. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that 
“inconsistency of jury results can be expected” because a “jury is empaneled to act as a 
decisionmaker in a single case, not as a more permanent body” and will necessarily “reach 
disparate outcomes based on the same instructions” and because of “generality of the 
instructions”).  
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Additionally, judge imposed punitive damages could not achieve identical 
punishment for identical respect. Judges, like juries, would lack a reference point 
to use to impose the award. Unlike juries, judges could look at previous punitive 
damage awards and match them. This solution has the same problems as the once 
popular one-award provision, where the defendant would be punished only once 
for its entire course of conduct.188 In the earlier case, “the full extent of the 
defendant’s malice” may not have yet been clear.189 Thus, the prior award may not 
properly reflect the extent of the defendant’s disrespect of the victim injured by the 
defective product, making it improper to repeat that prior award for the next victim 
injured by the same defective product. 
If juries and judges cannot implement a system of identical awards for those 
injured by the same product, the only possible reformer left is the legislature. Thus 
far, most legislative reforms have been based on ratios—mandating that the 
punitive damage award cannot exceed some multiple of the compensatory damage 
award—or split-recovery statutes—mandating that some percentage of the punitive 
damage award go to the state instead of the individual plaintiff.190 Neither of these 
types of reforms would help obtain identical awards. Ratios depend on the amount 
of compensatory damages. Two plaintiffs suffering the same disrespect can still 
receive vastly different punitive damage awards if their compensatory damages 
differ as they ordinarily will. Split-recovery schemes also will not result in 
identical awards for identical respect as they do not affect the amount awarded and 
will only reduce the amount the individual plaintiff can recover by a percentage. 
A legislature has the theoretical capacity to set amounts of punitive damages 
based on the specific defective product, but likely not the practical capacity. Again, 
if the award is defined too early, the legislature may not yet have full information 
regarding the extent of the defendant’s reprehensibility. Plus, the legislature is not 
practically equipped to be able to pass legislation specific to each defective product 
likely to be at issue in several lawsuits. Lawsuits would likely need to be filed to 
gain the legislature’s attention, leaving legislatures unable to define the 
punishment beforehand.  
Although a legislature is likely not able to set up the ideal system of defining 
a punishment specific to the defective product, a legislature does have the capacity 
to define a “hierarchy of fault within the realm of conduct subject to punitive 
                                                      
188 “Some courts and commentators have proposed what is essentially a ‘double 
jeopardy’ regime: having the jury in the first case that goes to trial determine an 
appropriate punishment (if any) for the entire course of conduct, and then precluding all 
subsequent juries from imposing punitive damages.” Colby, supra note 10, at 658; see also 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2015) (allowing “only one award of punitive damages 
[to] be recovered in a court in this state from a defendant for any act or omission” in a 
products liability claim). 
189 Colby, supra note 10, at 659.  
190 Victor E. Schwartz et. al., I’ll Take That: Legal and Public Policy Problems 
Raised by Statutes That Require Punitive Damages Awards to Be Shared with the State, 68 
MO. L. REV. 525, 526 (2003). 
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damages.”191 Such hierarchies do not currently exist legislatively. State statutes 
often clarify that punitive damages are available only upon a showing of evil intent 
or recklessness,192 but lack further differentiation of or guidance rating such levels. 
Such state statutes likely do not currently exist because they are difficult to 
create.193 One can agree on rating certain levels of culpability—evil intent based on 
a desire to injure is the most culpable, followed by evil intent based on 
substantially certain knowledge of injury, then followed by recklessness based on 
lesser knowledge. But how does the intended harm factor in? Evil intent to cause 
physical harm is likely more culpable than evil intent to cause economic harm, but 
is reckless disregard of the chance of physical harm more culpable than evil intent 
to cause economic harm?194 What about emotional harm? In addition to the 
difficulty of ranking culpability associated with harm, a legislative hierarchy 
would need to be extensive; tort law “cover[s] a wide range of disparate conduct—
from assault to trespassing to defamation to interference with business 
expectancies,” meaning hierarchies would need to cover “more finely grained 
categories of misconduct.”195  
Still, hierarchies are not impossible. To the contrary, they may already be 
socially ingrained. Professors Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahnman, and David Schkade 
surveyed jury-eligible citizens to study the arbitrariness and unpredictability of 
punitive damage awards. The citizens were presented with different personal injury 
scenarios in which the plaintiffs received $200,000 in compensatory damages and 
also requested punitive damages.196 The participants were asked to rank those 
scenarios, using a scale of zero to six, according to the outrageousness of the 
defendant’s behavior and how much the defendant should be punished, and then to 
separately assign a dollar amount of punitive damages.197 The researchers expected 
to find, and did find, remarkable similarity in the assignments of values for 
                                                      
191 Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 28 (2009). 
192 Annotation, Punitive Damages in Actions for Violations of Federal Civil Rights 
Acts, 14 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1973). 
193 This is the same reason that the Supreme Court’s reprehensibility guidepost has 
proven not to be user-friendly. “[T]he Court failed to provide clear guidance about when 
‘bad’ conduct was ‘so bad’ that it justified a particularly high award of punitive damages.” 
Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The 
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 349 (2008); 
see also Hines & Hines, supra note 52, at 1281 (explaining that the Supreme Court “shed 
little light on the relative importance of each factor or various combinations thereof.”).  
194 “The difficulties of cross-category comparisons inevitably lead to instability in the 
judgments of individuals, and to an impairment of consensus, relative to within-category 
comparisons.” Cass R. Sunstein et. al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1153, 1173 (2002). 
195 Fisher, supra note 191, at 41–42. 
196 Cass R. Sunstein et. al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition 
and Valuation in the Law), 107 YALE L. J. 2071, 2095 (1998). 
197 Id. 
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outrageousness and extent of punishment.198 They concluded that “[j]udgments of 
intent to punish in these personal injury scenarios evidently rest on a bedrock of 
moral intuitions that are broadly shared in society.”199 The researchers did not 
expect to find, however, similarity in the dollar amounts assigned.200 Again, they 
were correct. This is due to the difficulty of translating outrage into a dollar 
amount.201 
Another hierarchy can be deciphered from the results of Professor Michael 
Rustad’s empirical study on products liability punitive damage awards.202 The 
study looks at the 355 such punitive damage awards imposed between 1965 and 
1990.203 All involve manufacturers who knew of the probable risk of injury, yet 
different levels of reprehensibility are apparent in the awards. A very small 
percentage involved fraudulent-type misconduct,204 like knowledge of the risk plus 
concealment.205 Most, however, followed the “typical pattern of misconduct”—“a 
firm acquiring knowledge of a risk or danger caused by its product, and yet 
delaying remedial steps.”206 Another group of awards involved the defendants 
knowing of probable risks yet failing to warn of them,207 and another group of 
awards involved the defendants knowing of probable risks, yet refraining from 
conducting additional testing to confirm those risks.208   
After presenting the results of their study, Professors Sunstein, Kahneman, 
and Schkade suggested numerous reforms. One involved a hierarchy scale: ask the 
jury to decide, on a scale, how severe of punishment the defendant deserves.209 The 
judge would then convert that judgment into a dollar amount using preset 
guidelines.210 The professors noted the similarity of such a system to criminal 
sentencing where juries decide liability, but judges, using guidelines, decide 
                                                      
198 Id. at 2098–100. The researchers did find, however, a “statistically significant 
difference in average rates” between “women and men.” Id. at 2100. 
199 Id. at 2098. 
200 Id. as 2100. 
201 Id. at 2103. 
202 See generally Rustad, supra note 75, at 14–16 (discussing empirical data regarding 
punitive damages in tort law cases such as products liability). 
203 Id. at 38. 
204 Id. at 66. 
205 Id. at 68. 
206 Id. Professor Rustad separately groups awards based on fraudulent-type 
misconduct, violation of safety standards, inadequate testing/quality control, failure to warn 
of known dangers, and postmarketing failures to remedy known dangers. His description of 
cases in the safety-standard violation grouping includes cases where the defendant knew of 
the danger yet failed to notify the appropriate regulatory agency. Id. at 69–70. This could 
just as easily fit into the fraudulent-type misconduct category if focused on the knowledge 
instead on the safety standard violation.  
207 Id. at 71–73. 
208 Id. at 70–71. 
209 Sunstein et al., supra note 196, at 2121. 
210 Id. at 2113. 
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sentences.211 Professor Jeffrey Fisher more recently suggested creating a hierarchy 
for punitive damages similar to the criminal sentencing system to better achieve 
predictability and consistency within the imposition of punitive damages.212 
Product defect claims provide an opportunity for legislatures to begin to 
experiment with hierarchies because of the characteristics of the claims. For 
instance, product defects usually result in personal injuries.213 In fact, as a matter 
of law, product defect tort claims cannot be based on economic losses and must 
instead involve either personal injury or property damage.214 And, if punitive 
damages are available, personal injury was likely involved.215 This focus on 
personal injuries makes a hierarchy more feasible.216  
The hierarchy could then be based on: 1) the extent of the defendant’s 
knowledge; 2) the known likely injury; and 3) the type of product. 
  
                                                      
211 Id. at 2120. 
212 See generally Fisher, supra note 191 (discussing the implications of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker for the Court’s ongoing punitive 
damages jurisprudence). 
213 See, e.g., Jacob Kreutzer, Somebody Has to Pay: Products Liability for Spyware, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 61, 63 (2008). 
214 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
215 Rustad, supra note 75, at 32 n.167 (explaining that he did not include claims for 
economic loss in his extensive empirical study of products liability punitive damage awards 
because they are “too uncommon and unestablished”); see also id. at 62 (explaining that 
the plaintiffs receiving punitive damages in his study “were the victims of catastrophic 
injury or death”). 
216 All of the hypotheticals in Sunstein, Kahne, & Schkade’s study assumed $200,000 
in compensatory damages awarded, although the injuries differed. Sunstein et. al., supra 
note 196, at 2095. As examples, one plaintiff developed severe side-effects from using a 
baldness treatment, another suffered serious back injuries as a result of doing an exercise 
video, another was a child who suffered severe burns over a significant portion of his body 
when wearing flammable pajamas, and another suffered serious internal injuries due to 
defective brakes. See id. at Appendix C.  
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The extent of the defendant’s knowledge is, of course, greatly relevant to the 
extent of the defendant’s disrespect. The most culpable mindset is the defendant’s 
desiring to injure when selling a defective product, whereas the least culpable, yet 
still deserving punishment, mindset is the defendant’s knowing of the probability 
of injury. This scale of knowledge—ranging from desire to injure to knowledge of 
probable injury—mirrors the general levels of culpability in tort law and should be 
incorporated into any hierarchy of conduct subject to punitive damages. 
The injury about which the defendant knows should also be part of the 
hierarchy. Fewer levels of reprehensibility exist here as only knowledge of death 
or serious bodily injury are likely to trigger punitive damages. Serious bodily harm 
can still be divided as permanent or temporary. 
The last factor is the type of product, which is also relevant to the extent of 
the manufacturer’s disrespect. For instance, the manufacturer has great power over 
a victim needing a product for survival. Similarly, the manufacturer has great 
power over, and a great ability to take advantage of, vulnerable consumers like 
children. Lesser power exists when the product at issue is less necessary.  
Using these factors, Congress, the only legislature capable of creating 
national uniformity, could set awards. For instance, if the jury finds X extent of 
knowledge, Y likely injury, and Z type of product, then the product punitive 
damage award is $50,000.217 True, a legislature most often sets penalties for public 
wrongs, not private wrongs.218 Still, research of prior punitive damage awards and  
 
 
                                                      
217 Any legislative involvement in the setting of amounts of punitive damage awards 
is obviously inconsistent with the jury’s traditional discretion in deciding whether to 
impose damages and how much to impose. But there is likely no way to achieve any kind 
of consistency without infringing on that discretion. Plus, jury involvement is not 
constitutionally required. Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive 
Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179, 181 (1998). 
218 See generally Colby, supra note 10 (discussing punitive damage awards for 
private wrongs). 
2017] DEFECTIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 1057 
empirical research could help determine proper awards. Additionally, legislators 
obviously represent the community and thus have some ability to express the 
community’s disapproval of the manufacturer disrespecting victims’ rights. 
Assuming different juries hearing cases about the same defective product 
make the same factual conclusions about the manufacturer’s reprehensibility in 
selling that defective product, this type of hierarchy should create identical 
punitive damage awards for identical disrespect. The solution is not perfect as 
identical awards are not guaranteed, but the solution increases the chances. 
Notably, one factor that is not included is the plaintiff’s specific injury 
suffered. The manufacturer’s disrespect is based on the injury expected to occur, 
like permanent serious burns likely to result from a defect causing a vehicle to start 
on fire—not on the injury that occurred. It is possible that an individual victim 
escapes the vehicle early and suffers only smoke inhalation. But, the manufacturer 
disrespected the victim by selling a product it expected to cause burns. The fact 
that this victim was lucky does not alter that level of disrespect.219  
Another factor not included is the amount of the plaintiff’s compensatory 
damages. Amounts of compensatory damages are not relevant to the extent of the 
manufacturer’s disrespect, and thus the damages should not be a factor in the 
hierarchy.220 Notably, in Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade’s study, when making 
additional changes to the hypotheticals based on the injuries occurred, they found 
that the “harm that occurred did not affect the degree of outrage evoked by the 
defendant’s behavior.”221 The survey participants, did, however, alter the amounts 
of punitive damages awarded.222 This difference suggests that amounts of 
compensatory damages are interfering with juries’ abilities to translate their 
outrage into dollar amounts. Regardless, amounts of compensatory damages are 
not relevant to the manufacturer’s disrespect and should not be considered in the 
hierarchy.223 
                                                      
219 This is similar to a point the Court made in Philip Morris:  
 
[W]e can find no authority supporting the use of punitive damages awards for 
the purpose of punishing a defendant for harming others. We have said that it 
may be appropriate to consider the reasonableness of a punitive damages award 
in light of the potential harm the defendant’s conduct could have caused. But 
we have made clear that the potential harm at issue was harmed potentially 
caused the plaintiff.”  
 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354. 
220 See supra Part IV.B. 
221 Sunstein et al., supra note 196, at 2104.  
222 Id. at 2104–05 (explaining that the differing harms “had a small but statistically 
significant effect on punishment ratings, where defendants who had done more harm to the 
plaintiff were judged to deserve greater punishment” and a similar effect was seen in 
different assignments of dollar awards). 
223 This Article has also not included the defendant’s wealth as a relevant factor. 
Some states do allow the jury to consider the defendant’s wealth when determining the 
amount of punitive damages, usually justified by the need for a greater amount to deter a 
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One likely pushback is the appropriateness of a hierarchy system specific 
only to product defect claims. The same problem that product defect claims pose—
the defendant disrespecting many—also exists for other tortious conduct. This 
Article does not mean to suggest that hierarchies would be impermissible for other 
tort claims. Instead, it suggests a hierarchy for one context in which a hierarchy 
especially makes sense. Defective products injure many and, absent special 
circumstances, manufacturers act identically reprehensibly to those injured. That 
identical disrespect should be punished identically and a hierarchy is the best way 
to achieve such identical awards. Once a hierarchy is established, the legislature 
could clarify whether it could also serve as a reference point for other tort claims.  
Admittedly, legislative involvement seems antithetical to personalized 
punitive damages. Professor Sebok addressed this, discussing a possible system 
“where victims initiated the process but courts took over by applying schedules or 
ratios.”224 He admits that it would likely still be a system of state-sanctioned 
private revenge, but a compromised one because the injured plaintiff’s only power 
would be to seek “state-administered penalties . . . against her wrongdoer.”225 A 
non-compromised system must recognize “the victim’s right to decide whether and 
how the wrongdoer will suffer punishment” by providing her an “active role . . . in 
determining the appropriate remedy for her case of wrongful loss.”226  
Still, private redress theorists do not acknowledge the idea of identical 
disrespect—that a manufacturer can disrespect injured victims in the same way. If 
disrespect is identical, nothing in private redress theory otherwise precludes 
identical punitive damage awards. And even if a penalty is preset, Professor Sebok 
admits that a system would still empower the plaintiff to be punitive and to “make 
claims about the rightful treatment that she was owed.”227 It is just that, absent 
special circumstances, everyone injured by the defective product is entitled to that 
same rightful treatment. Identical disrespect should give rise to identical and 
consistent punitive damage awards, which can only be accomplished with 
legislatively set punitive damage awards. 
One additional possibility absent legislative action is to reevaluate class-wide 
punitive damages. The initial thought was that Philip Morris signaled the end of 
punitive damages in class actions because of the need for personalization: 
“Treating punitive damages as a class-wide issue despite the presence of individual 
injuries fails to connect punishment to each plaintiff’s harm.”228 That assumes 
                                                      
rich defendant. None of Colby, Zipursky, or Sebok discusses the defendant’s wealth as a 
factor relevant to measuring the defendant’s disrespect of the victim. 
224 Sebok, supra note 16, at 1027. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 1029. 
227 Id. at 1028. Additionally, the plaintiff is still bringing the claim, not the state. 
228 Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Punitive Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 906 (2008); 
see also, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 74, at 1138  (explaining that classwide punitive 
damages are likely not possible after Philip Morris); Byron G. Stier, Now It’s Personal: 
Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. 
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personalization to the amount of each plaintiff’s compensatory damages. Under the 
private redress theories, however, the amount of plaintiff’s compensatory damages 
is not relevant to the disrespect each plaintiff suffers.229 The foreseeable injury may 
be relevant to the level of disrespect, but the plaintiff’s occupation pre-injury is 
not. Thus, perhaps class-wide punitive damages are still possible after Philip 
Morris. 
No easy fix exists to change our current system of imposing punitive damages 
into one that will produce identical awards for identical disrespect. Regardless, 
there is value in recognizing the possibility of and need for uniformity under 
private redress theories of punitive damages. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Professor Ellen Wertheimer argues extensively against the imposition of 
punitive damages in strict products liability claims. One of her arguments is: 
 
In the context of design defects, a plaintiff prevails by showing that the 
particular defendant has been guilty of evil conduct in the course of 
designing its product. Since design defect cases focus on an aspect of the 
product that affects all of those who are exposed to it, the evil conduct at 
issue exists not with respect to any particular person, but rather with 
respect to that class of persons who have been or will be exposed to the 
product. The fact that a particular plaintiff proves an entitlement to 
punitive damages has little to do with the particular plaintiff, and 
everything to do with the conduct of the defendant towards a much 
larger group of people. Thus, there is no compelling reason why a 
particular plaintiff should receive the punitive damages award, any more 
than any other plaintiff who has been injured by the product. 230 
  
                                                      
REV. 433, 445–46 (2008) (explaining that classwide punitive damages are likely not 
possible after Philip Morris). But see Catherine M. Sharkey, The Future of Classwide 
Punitive Damages, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1127, 1140 (2013) (arguing that classwide 
punitive damages are still viable and that to “the extent that punitive damages embody a 
societal deterrence objective, a punitive damages class should be more—not less—prone to 
certification than any compensatory damages class, which is more apt to hinge on 
individualistic differences among plaintiffs.”). 
229 See supra Part IV.B (discussing that compensatory damage amounts are irrelevant 
to the defendant’s extent of disrespect). 
230 Wertheimer, supra note 125, at 516. 
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Wertheimer has little scholarly company—those that agree that punitive 
damages should not be available in products liability claims.231 And private redress 
theories address part of her critique. There is a compelling reason why a particular 
plaintiff injured by a defective product should receive a punitive damage award—
to provide her redress for the manufacturer disrespecting her rights. 
Nevertheless, Professor Wertheimer’s criticism is also not wrong. The 
manufacturer’s disrespectful conduct of selling a defective product despite 
knowing the probable injury was directed towards a much larger group of people. 
The manufacturer disrespected each of those victims identically.  The question 
then is how to give effect to these facts when applying private redress theories to 
product defect punitive damage awards. 
Private redress theories would appear to produce unique, personalized 
punitive damage awards to each plaintiff. But, in a product defect claim, the 
manufacturer disrespected each injured victim equally. And those injured victims 
should be able to seek redress for that disrespect, but they should also receive 
personalized yet identical punitive damage awards.	
                                                      
231 See 3 OWEN & DAVIS ON PROD. LIAB. § 26:20 & n.36 (4th ed.) (explaining that 
punitive damages are recoverable today “[n]otwithstanding the paucity of logical support 
for the proposition that punitive damages should not be allowable” advanced by “defense 
lawyers, and even one otherwise intelligent products liability scholar,” citing Professor 
Wertheimer). 
